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The dispute settlement provisions of the Convention on the
Law of the Sea manifest themselves in highly complex provisions.
This Article offers an examination and critiqueof the subjectprovisions, concluding that they reflect an inequitable bias in favor
of the Group of 77 and, although usefid, do not present a significant advance over the present system of internationallaw. The
author examines alternatives to the provisions adopted in the
Convention and suggests a possible revamping of the ICJor creation of a similar tribunal so as to resolve the dispute settlement
procedure'sinherent diffculties and shortcomings.

INTRODUCTION

A proper examination of the Convention on the Law of the Sea'
(the Convention) cannot divorce the document from its political

context. 2 The Convention is not a "neat legal document." 3
* Associate with the New York law firm of Shearman & Sterling. J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1981; BA., Yale University, 1978.
1. Draft Convention, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L98/Rev.4 (1981).
2. International politics significantly affect negotiations in the United Nations. The explosion in the number of sovereign States within the past twenty
years has had a profound impact on the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The countries of the Third World now constitute
nearly two-thirds of the nations of the world. These less developed countries
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Rather, it reflects political realities, balancing conflicting national
(LDCs) of South and Central America, Oceania, Africa, and Asia have organized
into a caucus commonly known as the Group of 77 (G-77). Charney, The International Regime for the Deep Seabed:-Past Conflicts and Proposalsfor Progress, 17
HARv. IN 'L L.J. 1, 6 (1976). The G-77 derived its name from the seventy-seven
countries which formed the caucus in 1974; today the caucus numbers nearly 120
members. Lee, Deep Seabed Mining and Developing Countries, 6 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & Com. 213 (1978-79). In order to assert greater influence on the management of global resources and international relations, the LDCs formulated the
New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO challenges the traditional
dominance of the developed countries over world resources and international affairs disproportionate to their percentage of the world population. See Charney,
supra, at 5-6; Juda, UNCLOS III and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 7
OCEAN DEvEL. & INT'L L. 221, 223-24 (1979). Seeking a more "equitable" distribution of power through the implementation of the NIEO, the G-77 hopes to bring
substantial economic and political benefits to the Third World. Charney, supra, at
6; Gamble, Bloc Thinking About The Oceans: Accelerating Pluralism?in LAw OF
THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEAN (J. Gamble & G. Pontecoro eds.

1974). The UNCLOS I is a testing ground for the new-found power of the G-77 in
implementing the goals of the NIEO.
The developed countries represent the other major voting bloc in the UNCLOS
HI. In contrast to the organization of the G-77, the developed nations are loosely
aligned and lack a formal voice in the international arena. While they share a
common goal of maintaining their historically dominant position in natural resource control and international relations, Charney, supra, at 6-7, the developed
countries do not present a cohesive front. For example, Canada, as a land-based
producer of nickel, has sought to restrict deep seabed mining of nickel, often siding with African exporters of nickel. United States Delegation Report- Resumed
Ninth Sess. of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 5 (July
28-Aug. 29, 1980, Geneva). For a discussion of the Canadian position, see Herman,
The Niceties ofNickel-Canada and the ProductionCeilingIssue at the Law of the
Sea Conference, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 265 (1978-79).
The G-77 appears to enjoy the advantage in the bargaining process in the UNCLOS JIL Not only do the LDCs have greater numbers and superior organization,
the G-77 is able to take a more aggressive stance than can the developed countries
because of their lack of vested economic interests in the issues. In other words,
the G-77 has much to gain and little to lose. See BuzAN, SEABED PouMcs 296
(1976).
Several factors, however, may offset the power of the G-77. The G-77 operates
by caucus. Inherent in this method of operation is a certain inflexibility in the G77's bargaining position which arises out of extensive internal negotiation and
compromise. Buzan, supra,at 300 n.2. In addition, the number of nations and the
multiplicity of views within the bloc may act as a force against the cohesion of the
G-77. Gamble, supra, at 4.
Second, the consensus-oriented procedure of the UNCLOS HI enhances the position of the developed States despite their numerical minority because of their
ability to slow or stop the proceedings. Time is an important factor in negotiation.
The prolonged passage of time weakens alignments and decreases the commitment of delegations to the convention as States -with urgent maritime problems
become frustrated with the slowness of the negotiation. Buzan, supra, at 281, 294.
An additional factor which checks the G-77 is the LDCs' lack of maritime technology. Pardo, Commentary in LAw OF THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE
OCEANS, supra, at 12. The danger that the developed countries may reject any
conclusion of the UNCLOS HI may have caused the G-77 to moderate some of its
demands. Despite these factors, the LDCs' numbers and vociferousness enable
them to exert strong moral and political pressures on the UNCLOS HI proceedings.
The usual tensions involved in the North-South dialogue are sufficient to ob-
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and international goals. The results of diplomatic horsetrading
often manifest themselves in complex, if not "baffling," provisions.4 The dispute settlement provisions of the Convention are
no exception.5 The drafters undertook a staggering task. The provisions attempt to provide dispute settlement mechanisms for all
matters of contention arising out of the law of the sea-boundary
disputes, 6 navigation 7 and pollution issues,8 fishery matters,9 marstruct multinational negotiations. In addition to these problems, a number of cir-

cumstances present in the UNCLOS III serve to complicate and delay
deliberations. Foremost, perhaps, among these factors is the participation in the
UNCLOS III of nations with little intrinsic interest in the law of the sea. Gamble,
supra, at 5. These are nations which either have no coastlines or lack the capital
to engage in maritime activities. These States participate as equal partners in the
negotiations with a right to express their views on every issue. Id. Arguably,
these nations have an interest in the law of the sea regime because the sea is the
"common heritage of mankind" to be exploited for the benefit of all. These nations
have substantially complicated the negotiations by introducing non-maritime related issues into the UNCLOS MInegotiations. Id. Having little intrinsic interest

in the law of the sea, these States have a great temptation to engage in substantial
vote bargaining to achieve non-maritime related goals. Pardo, supra, at 12. The
injection of extraneous issues complicates the numerous and complex maritime
issues.
Moreover, many of the newly emerged nations have little expertise in the technical and economic aspects of the law of the sea issues. Juda, supra, at 223. This
lack of expertise both slows the progress of the UNCLOS II, Buzan, supra, at 280,
and prevents the delegations from properly evaluating the impact on their countries from their positions taken at the UNCLOS II. Juda, supra, at 223. (For detailed examination of the factors which affected the progress of the negotiation as
a whole, see Buzan, supra, at 280-81, 294-95.)
The drafting of the dispute settlement provision took place against this background of shifting and conflicting policies and goals. The dispute settlement provisions, as discussed infra, mirror the diplomatic negotiations. The task undertaken
at the UNCLOS I is staggering-156 participants and some 91 principal issues.
Hull, Introduction, 6 SYRACUSE J. INTL L & COM. 169, 171 (1978-79). At least one
commentator has argued strongly against the United Nations convening another
conference the size and complexity of the UNCLOS I because of the impact of
the built-in mechanisms for delay and obstructionism. See Miles, An Interpretation of the CaracasProceedings in LAw OF THE SEA: CARACAS AN BEYOND 39 (F.
Christy et al. eds. 1976).
3. Adede, Prolegomenato the Disputes Settlement Partof the Law of the Sea
Convention, 10 N.Y.U. J. IwrL I &PoL 252, 286 (1977).
4. Id. Examples of the complexity of the provisions are the choice of dispute
settlement procedures, scope of the compulsory procedures, and exceptions to the
procedures. See notes 41-47, 77-78 and accompanying text infra.
5. The Eleventh Session of the UNCLOS HI is currently underway in New
York. According to the United States Delegation Report for the Resumed Ninth
Session, supra note 2, the negotiations on the settlement of disputes are substantially completed.
6. Draft Convention, supra note 1, arts. 3-16.
7. Id. arts. 86-115.
8. Id. arts. 192-237.

itime scientific researchO and deep seabed mining disputes," and
transfer of technology problems,12 to name a few. Each of these
areas involves different political and economic issues, requiring
varying degrees of technical, legal, and scientific expertise. The
dispute settlement mechanism set forth in Part XV of the Convention raises two salient issues: whether the system is fair and
equitable, and whether the provisions present an advance over
the present methods of dispute settlement in the law of the sea.
PROCEDURES FOR

DIsPuTE SETrLEmENT

Part XV of the Convention contains the main dispute settlement provisions.'3 The drafters divided Part XV into three sections: general obligations and provisions, the procedure for
compulsory dispute settlement, and the limitations on the subject
matter jurisdiction of the compulsory dispute settlement
mechanism.
Section One outlines the preliminary steps to which all disputes are subject, giving due regard to the independent sover9. Id. arts. 116-120.
10. Id. arts. 238-265.
11. Id. arts. 150-153.
12. Id. arts. 266-278.
13. The development of the Convention's dispute settlement provisions occurred in two stages. From 1974 to 1976, an unofficial informal working group of
interested delegates (IWG) prepared draft provisions. The official debate then began in 1976 on a modified IWG proposal known as the "President's Text."
The IWG, meeting at the initiative of the United States, proceeded on the bases
of four fundamental principles. In order to avoid economic and political pressure
and to preserve the equality of States, an effective system for the settlement of
disputes must have its basis in law. The greatest possible uniformity in interpretation of the Convention was desirable. Also, any exceptions to the obligatory dispute settlement provisions had to be drafted narrowly. Finally, the dispute
settlement provisions had to form an integral part of the Convention. Adede,
supra note 3, at 255-56. The IWG proposal submitted to the President of the UNCLOS HI contained a wide range of modes of dispute settlement. It also introduced the concept of a Law of the Sea Tribunal. Characteristic of the proposal
was its comprehensive approach, which sought to establish a single system to deal
with all manner of disputes, as opposed to a "functional" approach that would
have established special procedures to render binding decisions arising out of different parts of the Convention.
The debate over the President's Text continued with respect to the functional
versus the comprehensive approach, the applicability of compulsory settlement
procedures to coastal States and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the application of the procedure to sea boundary delimitation. The goal guiding the
course of the debates was the desire to take dispute settlement out of the arena of
force. Parties should choose peaceful methods including compulsory, binding procedures to settle law of the sea disputes. The system which has emerged is highly
complex and often unwieldy. A simpler formulation, however, would not have
gathered the necessary consensus. Therefore, the dispute settlement provisions
reflect, if not accommodate, all the political issues raised during the course of the
debates. (For a comprehensive "legislative history" of the early stages of the negotiation over the IWG's and President's Texts, see Adede, supra note 3.)
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eignty of State parties. The section evidences a dedication to the
resolution of disputes by peaceful means 14 which are chosen by
the parties to the dispute.15 A general obligation on the State parties to "expeditiously... exchange... views"16 regarding settlement of the dispute strives to further the goal of peaceful
resolution of disputes by keeping the lines of communication between the parties open. The Convention makes specific reference
to the dispute settlement methods listed in article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations' 7 as examples of peaceful dispute settlement procedures.18 The Convention provisions also allow a great
deal of flexibility as to the dispute settlement forum, including regional, general, or special arrangements.19 Finally, Section One
outlines the option of non-binding conciliation. A State party may
invite the other parties to submit the dispute to conciliation.2 0
The parties must agree both on conciliation as a means of resolving the dispute and on the procedure for conciliation. 2 ' On dis14. Article 279 of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, reads:
"States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations, and, to this end, shall seek
a solution by the means indicated in article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

15. Article 280 of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, states:
"Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time
to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice."
16. Id. art. 283.
17. The peaceful means of dispute settlement referred to in article 33 of the
Charter of the United Nations are "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement, or other
peaceful means .... " U.N. CHARTER, art. 33, para. 1.
18. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 279.
19. Id. art. 282.
20. Id. art. 284, para. 1.
21. Id. art. 284. Annex V of the Draft Convention outlines a possible procedure for conciliation. Any party to a dispute may institute a conciliatory proceeding by notifying the other party in writing. Id. Annex V, art. 1. The Secretary
General of the United Nations maintains a list of conciliators. Each State which is
a contracting party to the Convention may nominate four conciliators which remain on the list until withdrawn by the nominating State. Id. Annex V, art. 2. The
constitution of the Conciliation Coimmission, which may be modified by mutual
consent of the parties, usually will consist of five members. The party instituting
the proceeding may appoint two from the Secretary General's list, one of whom
may be a national. The opposing party also may select two in the same fashion.
If, however, the party does not make an appointment within a prescribed time, the
instituting party may either terminate the proceedings or ask the Secretary General to make an appointment. These four conciliators then choose a fifth from the
list. The decision apparently must be unanimous. If the conciliators fail to chose
a fifth, the Secretary General will do so. Id, Annex V, art. 3. The conciliators,

putes dealing with deep seabed mining, non-State parties also
may go to conciliation. 22 Only when the method chosen by the
parties fails to settle the dispute, do the provisions of Section Two
concerning compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions ap23
ply at the request of any party to the dispute.
A State party may choose one or more of the following dispute
settlement procedures by means of a written declaration:2 4 1) the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 2 5 (Tribunal); 2) the
International Court of Justice (ICJ); 3) an arbitral tribunal;2 6 and
4) a special arbitral tribunal for the settlement of disputes concerning fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research, or navigation and pollution
by vessels. 27 These courts and tribunals have jurisdiction over all
seeking advice from the parties, will then adopt their own procedure. All decisions and recommendations are by majority vote. Id- Annex V, art. 4. The Conciliation Commission proceeds with an eye towards amicable settlement and may
attempt to direct the parties to other peaceful means of dispute settlement. Id.
Annex V, art. 5. The conciliators hear the parties, examine claims and objections,
and make proposals. Id. Annex V, art. 6. The Conciliation Commission must
make a report within twelve months of establishment. Such report is nonbinding
on the parties. Id. Annex V, art. 7. The conciliation procedure may be terminated
in one of three ways: settlement, rejection by the parties of proposals, or automatically three months after transmission of report to the parties. Id. Annex V, art. 8.
22. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 285.
23. Id. arts. 281, 286.
24. Id. art. 287, para. 1.
25. See notes 48-72, 79-82 accompanying text infra.
26. Annex VII of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, describes the arbitral tribunal. Similar to the procedure for the Conciliation Commission described in note
21 supra, any party to the dispute may institute the proceeding by notifying the
other parties. Id. Annex VII, art. 1. Again the Secretary General of the United Nations maintains a list of arbitrators selected in a manner substantially the same as
that of the list of conciliators. Id Annex VII art. 2. See note 21 supra. Unless the
parties otherwise agree, the tribunal usually shall consist of five members. Each
party to the dispute shall appoint one arbitrator, preferably from the list. The appointee may be a national. The remaining three members are chosen by agreement of the parties. From among these three, the parties shall appoint a
President. Should the parties fail to make the necessary appointments, the President of the Tribunal, unless otherwise agreed, shall make the appointment. Id
Annex VI, art. 3. The arbitral tribunal adopts its own procedure. d. Annex VI,
art. 5. The parties to the dispute have the duty to facilitate the work of the arbitrators by providing all the relevant documents and information and by enabling the
arbitral tribunal to examine witnesses or experts and visit the locations in question. d. Annex VII, art 6. Decisions of the arbitral tribunal are by majority vote.
Id. Annex VII art. 8. The award is final and without appeal, unless the parties
agree otherwise. Id. Annex VIL art. 11. The arbitral tribunal will interpret the
award in case of controversy. The parties may agree, however, to submit the
award to another court or tribunal for interpretation. Id. Annex VII, art. 12. The
provisions of Annex VII may apply mutativ mutandis to non-State parties. Id. Annex VIL art. 13.
27. Annex VIH to the Draft Convention, supra note 1, contains the provisions
forming special arbitral tribunals. Proceedings are instituted in the same manner
as under arbitral tribunals. See id. Annex VIII, art. 1, supra note 26. Separate lists
of experts shall be maintained for each of the specialized fields of subject matter.
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law of the sea matters submitted to them in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention. 28 In disputes involving scientific or
technical issues, the court or tribunal may select two or more
technical or scientific experts to sit without the right to vote with
the court or tribunal.29 All State parties have access to these
courts and tribunals30 in addition, the dispute settlement procedures may be open to non-State parties in deep seabed mining
disputes. 31 The law applicable to the submitted disputes shall be
the Convention and such other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention. 32 The court or tribunal, if requested by the parties, may make its decision ex aequo et bono.33
The decisions are final and binding as between the parties. 3 4 The
Convention has no provision for an enforcement mechanism similar to that found in the Charter of the United Nations which provides that, in certain circumstances, the Security Council may act
35
as an enforcer of ICJ decisions.
All contracting parties are covered by a compulsory procedure
These lists shall be held by the appropriate specialized United Nations Agency.
Each State party to the Convention nominates two experts in each of the fields
whose names remain on the list until withdrawn by the nominating State. Id. Annex VIII art. 2. The special arbitral tribunal generally is composed of five members. Each party to the dispute may appoint two members, one of whom may be
its national. The fifth member of the special arbitral tribunal shall be chosen by
agreement of the parties. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall appoint members in the event the parties fail to do so. I& Annex VIII, art. 3. Articles 4 to 12 of Annex VII concerning arbitral tribunals, see note 26 supra, shall
apply mutatis mutandisto special arbitral procedure. Id. Annex VIII, art. 4. In addition to its adjudicatory role, a special arbitral tribunal may be constituted to
make findings of fact with respect to a dispute falling into one of the special categories. Id. Annex VIII, art. 5.
28. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 288. The court or tribunal itself shall
decide whether it has jurisdiction should a disagreement arise. Id art. 288, para. 4.
Although the drafters of the provisions professed a desire to attain a high degree
of uniformity in the interpretation of the Convention, the drafters surprisingly
have proposed a multiplicity of fora which may interpret and apply the
Convention.
29. Id. art. 289.
30. Id. art 291, para. 1.
31. Id. art. 291, para. 2. Non-State parties must meet the requirement of having exhausted local remedies prior to submitting a dispute to a court or tribunal
under these articles. Although the provision is not clear, the requirement apparently does not apply to State parties. Id art. 295.
32. Id- art. 293, para. 1.
33. Id. art. 293, para. 2.
34. Id. art. 296. The court or tribunal also has the power to prescribe provisional measures pending final adjudication. Id. art. 290.
35. U.N. CHARTER, art 94, para. 2.

entailing binding decisions. If the parties to the dispute have accepted the same procedure, they will submit the dispute to that
procedure. 36 If the parties have not chosen the same procedure,
the dispute will go before an arbitral tribunal.37 If any of the parties to the dispute has not chosen any procedure, Part XV deems
the parties to have accepted the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal
and the dispute is submitted thereto. 38 The parties to the dispute
may agree to present the dispute to a forum other than that specified in the foregoing scheme. 3 9 The freedom of the contracting
parties to choose a dispute settlement procedure does not alter
the obligation of each contracting State to accept the jurisdiction
of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the Tribunal for deep seabed
mining disputes.40
Section Three of Part XV delineates the limitations on and exceptions to the compulsory dispute settlement provisions. The
limitations on the compulsory procedures exempt certain types of
disputes that arise out of the coastal State's discretionary exercise of sovereignty with respect to the uses of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).41 Similarly, the optional exceptions to the
procedures remove additional categories of disputes at the discre36. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 287, para. 4.
37. Id. art. 287, para. 5.
38. Id. art. 287, para. 3.
39. Id. art. 287, paras. 3-5.
40. Id. art. 287, para. 2. This obligation is not clear from the text, but the negotiations indicate that the delegations consider the acceptance of the Chamber's jurisdiction mandatory. Burnhardt, Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the Law of
the Sea Negotiations: A Reassessment, 19 VA_ J. INT'L L. 67, 68 (1978).

41. Article 297 of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, places the following limitations on the applicability of the compulsory dispute settlement provisions:
1. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign
rights or jurisdiction provided for in this Convention, shall be subject to
the procedures provided for in section 2 in the following cases:
(a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of
the provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of
navigation or overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or
in regard to other intentionally lawful uses of the sea specified in article
58; or
(b) when it is alleged that a State in exercising the aforementioned
freedoms, rights or uses has acted in contravention of the provisions of
this Convention or of laws or regulations adopted by the coastal State in
conformity with this Convention and other rules of international law not
incompatible with this Convention; or
(c) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of
specified international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment which are applicable to the coastal
State and which have been established by this Convention or through a
competent international organization or diplomatic conference acting in
accordance with this Convention.
2.(a) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to marine scientific research shall be
settled in accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not
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tion of the State party involved. 42 These categories include: sea
boundary delimitations, 43 military activities and certain law enbe obliged to accept the submission to such settlement any dispute arising
out of:
(i) the exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion in
accordance with article 246; or
(ii) a decision by the coastal State to order suspension or cessation of
a research project in accordance with article 253.
(b) a dispute arising from an allegation by the researching State that
with respect to a specific project the coastal State is not exercising its
rights under articles 246 and 253 in a manner compatible with this Convention shall be submitted, at the request of either party, to conciliation,
under Annex V, section 2, provided that the conciliation commission shall
not call in question the exercise by the coastal State of its discretion to
designate specific areas as referred to in article 246, paragraph 6, or of its
discretion to withhold consent in accordance with article 246, paragraph 5.
3.(a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged
to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute relating to its
sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of
surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its
conservation and management laws and regulations ....
The effects of these exclusions on the practical effects of the Convention are discussed at notes 77-78 and accompanying text infra.
42. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 298.
43. Article 298, para. 1(a) of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, allows for the
exception of:
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or at any time thereafter, a State may declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the
procedures in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of
disputes:
(a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles
15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles, provided that a State having made
such a declaration shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent
to the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties, at the request of any party to the
dispute, accept submission of the matter to conciliation under
Annex V of section 2; and provided further that any dispute that
necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory shall be excluded from such
submission;
(ii) after the conciliation commission has presented its report, which
shall state the reasons on which it is based, the parties shall negotiate an agreement on the basis of that report; if these negotiations do not result in an agreement, the parties shall, by mutual
consent, submit the question to one of the procedures provided
for in section 2, unless the parties otherwise agree;
(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any sea boundary dispute
finally settled by an arrangement between the parties, or to any

forcement measures connected with the exercise of sovereignty
within the coastal States' EEZ,44 and disputes over which the Security Council of the United Nations has exercised its
45
jurisdiction.
CRrTIQuE OF THE

DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS

The Convention's dispute settlement mechanism is not a fair
and equitable resolution to the problem of dispute settlement.
The provisions reflect an inequitable bias in favor of the Group of
77 (G-77) and their goals under the New International Economic
Order.4 6 The limitations and exceptions to the compulsory dispute settlement provisions show the influence of the G-77.
Through the use of these provisions, the coastal State members of
the G-77 can exercise a great deal of discretionary power concerning the uses of EEZs without having to submit any dispute to a
procedure which would entail a binding decision.4 7
Similarly, the newly established Tribunal, in both its composition and organization, favors the G-77. The Tribunal will consist
of twenty-one "independent" members.4 8 The Convention states
that the Tribunal shall represent the world's principal legal systems and have an equitable geographical distribution.4 9 However,
such dispute which is to be settled in accordance with a bilateral
or multilateral agreement binding upon those parties.
44. Article 298, para. 1(b) of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, provides for
the optional exception of:
(b) disputes concerning military activities, including military activities
by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service,
and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a
court or tribunal under article 297, paragraphs 2 and 3.
45. Article 298, para. 1(c) of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, permits a nation to exclude:
(c) disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the
United Nations, unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter
from its agenda or calls upon the parties to settle it by the means provided
for in this Convention.
46. See note 2 supra.
47. These limitations and exceptions are the resolution of a "delicate question" concerning the sovereignty of coastal States. Coastal States sought protection from harassment through international tribunals arising out of the States'
discretionary acts within the EEZs. However, the rights and freedoms of the other
States would be meaningless if they had no mechanism by which to challenge arbitrary and capricious behavior. Adede, supra note 3, at 262. The Convention appears to have resolved the question in favor of the coastal States. For a brief
statement of the arguments against the limitation, see Haight, Commentary in
LAW OF THE SEA 250-53 (Miles et al eds. 1976).
48. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex VI, art. 2, para. 1.
49. Id Annex VI, art. 2 para. 2.
The members of the Tribunal are elected by the State parties from a list of persons nominated by the State parties. I&L Annex VI, art. 4, para. 1. Each State
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no two members may be nationals of the same State5 0 and no
fewer than three members shall represent each geographical
group established by the United Nations General Assembly.5 '
The result of this latter provision is that the nations from the
Asian, African, Eastern European, and Latin American regional
groups may have as many as eighteen of the twenty-one judges
and the group of Western Europe and others (including the
United States) may have only three.52 Thus the entire Tribunal
reflects a bias in favor of the G-77. At no time does an industrialized country or its national, which is a party to a dispute, have a
guarantee of adequate representation of its legal system or political philosophy.53 Only the Tribunal as a whole with twenty-one
party may nominate not more than two persons enjoying "the highest reputation
for fairness and integrity and of recognized competence in matters relating to the
law of the sea." Id. Annex VI, art. 2, para. 1, art. 4, para. 1. At a meeting of the
State parties, for which two-thirds of the State parties shall constitute a quorum,
the nominees who receive the largest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of
those States present and voting shall be elected to the Tribunal. Id. Annex VI, art.
4, para. 4. Each term of office shall be nine years and each member of the Tribunal
may be re-elected. Id. Annex VI, art. 5, para. 1.
50. Id. Annex VI, art. 3, para. 1.
51. Id. Annex VI, art. 3, para. 2. The five regional groups are Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Western Europe and others. Lee, Machinery for
Seabed Mining: Some General Issues before the Geneva Session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in LAW OF =H SEA: CARACAS
AN BEYOND, supra note 2, at 146, nn. 25 &26.
52. One commentator had harsh words for the composition of the Tribunal
proposed under an earlier version of the Convention which would have led to a
similar result.
There is the question whether a law of the sea tribunal composed of a
fixed number of judges appointed for a specified number of years is necessary or advisable and, if so, whether it should be constructed along the
lines of Annex VI .... Article 3 of this Annex provides that members of
the tribunal shall be elected according to five geographical groups, the
number from each group being specified. The result of this would be that
the African, Asian, and Latin American groups would have ten of the
fifteen judges and the group of Western European and other states only
three. It appears quite clear from this that the developing countries are
thinking not in terms of an independent judicial body but of another instrument for the development of their positions. If this view prevails,
there would be a built-in bias prejudicial to the settlement of disputes between developed and developing countries or between nationals of the latter and governments of the former.
Haight, supra note 47, at 254.
53. This bias may be lessened in part by article 17 of Annex VI to the Draft
Convention, supra note 1. Article 17 provides that members of the nationality of
the parties to the dispute may continue to participate in the adjudication of the
dispute. Id. Annex VI, art. 17, para. 1. Each party to the dispute-unless several
parties have the same interest in which case they are considered as one party
only, id.Annex VI, art. 17, para. 5-has the right to have as a member of the Tribu-

members of the entire Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber5 4 with eleven
members must present an equitable geographical and legal balance. However, a quorum of eleven members is sufficient to con55
stitute the Tribunal although all available members should sit.
56
Similarly, the Chamber needs a quorum of seven members. The
quorum of the Tribunal or the Chamber which hears the dispute
57
does not have to reflect the supposed "equitable" balance.
Furthermore, the special chambers which the Tribunal may create are not free from bias. The Tribunal may establish special
chambers for three purposes: as necessary to deal with specific
categories of disputes,58 to hear and determine disputes by summary procedure, 59 or at the request of the parties to deal with a
particular dispute.60 The special chambers formed to hear certain
61
categories of disputes will consist of three or more members.
The special chamber created to decide disputes by summary procedure is composed of five members. 62 No requirement of equitable geographical distribution and representation of major legal
systems governs the selection of members of these special chambers. Equitable representation is likely only in those special
chambers established at the request of the parties to deal with a
particular dispute. The Tribunal determines the composition of
nal one of its nationals. Thus, if a party does not have a national on the Tribunal,
the party may choose a person to participate as a member of the Tribunal. Id.
Annex VI, art. 17, paras. 2-3. These provisions also apply to the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber, see notes 64-75 and accompanying text infra, and the special chambers,
see notes 58-63 and accompanying text infra. Id Annex VI, art. 17, para. 4. The
impact of this "nationality requirement" on the impartiality of and equitable representation in the Tribunal is doubtful, the addition of a single member is not
likely to overcome the bias of the majority of the other members of the Tribunal,
especially since the opposing party also may appoint a member to the Tribunal.
54. See notes 64-75 and accompanying text infra.
55. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex VI, art. 13, para. 1. The Tribunal
shall decide who is available to sit on any given dispute, showing due regard to the
effective functioning of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber and the special chambers.
Id Annex VI, art. 13, para. 2. Certain restrictions exist with regard to the participation of members who have an interest in the dispute or an association with one
of the parties. Id. Annex VI, arts. 7-8. The Tribunal hears all disputes unless the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber or a special chamber has jurisdiction. Id. Annex VI,
art. 13, para. 3. The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, dealing exclusively with matters
arising from deep seabed mining, id. Annex VI, art. 14, is composed of eleven
members selected by the majority of the Tribunal. Id Annex VI, art. 36, para. 1.
The special chambers will consist of three or more members. Id. Annex Vl, art. 15,
para. 1.
56. Id. Annex VI, art. 36, para. 7.
57. The legal independence of the Tribunal and its members is suspect. See
notes 80-82 and accompanying text iftfra.
58. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex VI, art. 15, par. 1.
59. Id. Annex VI, art. 15, parm. 3.
60. Id. Annex VI, art. 15, para. 2.
61. Id. Annex VI, art. 15, para. 1.
62. I& Annex VI, art. 15, para. 3.
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the chamber but the parties to the dispute must give their

approval.6 3
In the establishment of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the

Tribunal, the G-77 has made an important step towards the objectives of the New International Economic Order at the expense of
the developed nations. The G-77 views control over deep seabed
mining as a major factor in the global redistribution of wealth and
management of world natural resources.6 4 Consequently, the G77 has sought to strengthen the power of the Authority, the international organization established to regulate deep seabed mining.65 Limiting the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes
63. Id. Annex VI, art. 15, para. 2.
64. See note 2 supra.
65. The International Sea-Bed Authority (the Authority) is the organization
through which State parties will organize and control activities within the "Area,"
primarily with respect to mineral resources. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art.
157. The Convention provides that no mining shall take place in the Area except
as authorized by the Authority. Id art. 137. The Area is the seabed, ocean floor,
and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. IMEart. 1. The Area
and its mineral resources are the "common heritage of mankind." Id. art. 136.
This means both that no State may exercise sovereignty over any portion of the
Area, id. art. 137, and that any activities carried out within the Area benefit mankind as a whole without respect to geographic location. Id. art. 140, para. 1.
The organs of the Authority are the Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat and
the Enterprise. Id. art. 158. The Assembly is the supreme organ of the Authority,
setting matters of general policy, electing the members of the other organs, setting
the budget, and approving various submissions by the Council. Id. arts. 3, 159, 160.
The membership of the Assembly consists of all members of the Authority (i.e. all
State parties to the Convention). Id. art. 159. Each member has one vote. Id. Because the G-77 consists of nearly a two-thirds majority, the LDCs have effective
control of the Assembly in a manner similar to that currently exercised in the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
The Council is the executive organ of the Authority. It sets specific policies and
exercises supervisory control over the activities of the members of the Authority.
Id. arts. 161, 162. The Council has thirty-six members elected by the Assembly
which must reflect a special geographic and economic distribution. Id. art. 161.
The membership of the Council appears to be biased in favor of the LDCs which
has negative implications for successful deep seabed mining; among these countries are those which have the least expertise in maritime technological matters,
have little or no intrinsic interest in the law of the sea, or have nationalistic interests as land-based producers of mineral resources. See note 2 supra. Each member of the Council has one vote, but substantive and procedural questions have
different voting majority requirements. Id. The Council has two subsidiary organs, each with fifteen members elected by the Council: the Economic Planning
Commission and the Legal and Technical Commission. Id. art. 163. The Economic
Planning Commission reviews trends in and factors affecting the supply, demand,
and prices of raw materials obtainable from the Area and makes recommendations on how to minimize the adverse impact on developing States which may be
land-based producers. Id art. 164. The Legal and Technical Commission supervises the technical, scientific and environmental aspects of the exploitation of

Chambers is one way to enhance the power of the Authority.
While the jurisdiction of the Chamber extends to all deep seabed
mining disputes 6 6 and access to the Chamber is open to the Authority, State parties, and State nationals, 67 the jurisdiction of the
Chamber over decisions of the Authority is limited. The Chamber
may not make pronouncements on whether the rules and regulations of the Authority conform to the Convention.68 Thus, the
Chamber may rule only on the application of the Authority's procedures and not on their validity.
In addition, the Chamber has no jurisdiction with respect to the
exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers, 69 and the
ocean minerals. Among its most important functions are the approval of applications by private and State parties for the mining of the deep seabed and the calculation of annual production ceilings and individual production authorizations. Id.
art. 165.
Of the remaining two organs, the Secretariat is the chief administrative organ of
the Authority, id. art. 166, and the Enterprise engages in the commercial exploitation of mineral resources. I&. art. 170.
Annex I to the Draft Convention, supra note 1, contains the basic conditions
for the prospecting, exploration, and exploitation of deep seabed hard minerals.
66. Article 187 of the Draft Convention, supra note 1, delineates the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall have jurisdiction under this Part
and the Annexes relating thereto, in disputes with respect to activities in
the Area falling within the following categories:
(a) disputes between States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Part and the Annexes relating thereto;
(b) disputes between a State Party and the Authority concerning(i) acts or omissions of the Authority or of a State Party alleged to be
in violation of this Part or the Annexes relating thereto or of rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority adopted in accordance
therewith; or
(ii) acts of the Authority alleged to be in excess of jurisdiction or a
misuse of power;
(c) disputes between parties to a contract, being States Parties, the
Authority or the Enterprise, state enterprises and natural or juridical persons referred to in article 153, paragraph 2(b), concerning
(i) the interpretation or application of a relevant contract or a plan of
work;
(ii) acts or omissions of a party to the contract relating to activities in
the Area and directed to the other party or directly affecting its legitimate interests;
(d) disputes between the Authority and a prospective contractor who
has been sponsored by a State as provided in article 153, paragraph 2(b),
and has duly fulfilled the conditions referred to in Annex III, article 4, paragraph 6 and article 13, paragraph 2, concerning the refusal of a contract,
or a legal issue arising in the negotiation of the contract;
(e) disputes between the Authority and a State Party, a state enterprise or a natural or juridical person sponsored by a State Party as provided for in article 153, paragraph 2(b), where it is alleged that the
Authority has incurred liability as provided in Annex II, article 22;
(f) any dispute for which jurisdiction of the Chamber is specifically
provided in this convention.
67. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 187, Annex VI, Art. 38.
68. Id. art. 189.
69. Id.
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Convention does not define the scope of the discretionary power
of the Authority and its subsidiary organs. Thus the "negotiation"
of contract terms may be discretionary, as could be the selection
from among conflicting contract applications or the refusal to conclude contracts. 70 This limitation on the jurisdiction of the Chamber also casts doubt on the ability of State parties to challenge
the acts of the Authority as ultra vires.7 1 Similarly, the prohibition on the review of the Authority's discretionary acts could prevent the Chamber from hearing disputes between the Authority
and a national on issues arising out of contract refusal or contract
negotiation. 72 Thus the limitations on the jurisdiction of the
Chamber leave little check on arbitrary and capricious behavior
of the Authority.
The mandatory nature of the acceptances by contracting States
of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber's jurisdiction creates an additional problem.7 3 If the Tribunal develops into a politically biased
organ, State parties to disputes usually have the option of avoiding its jurisdiction by mutually agreeing to accept another forum.7

4

This option is not in reality available in deep seabed

disputes involving the Authority. If the Chamber is biased in
favor of the Authority, the Authority may refuse to submit to alternative fora, thereby forcing the settlement of the dispute into
the nonobjective Chamber.75 In light of the foregoing discussion,
70. See Ratiner & Wright, The Billion Dollar Decision Is Deepsea Mining a
PrudentInvestment?, 10 LAw. Am. 713, 759-60 (1978).
71. See note 66 supra.
72. Id.
73. See note 40 supra.
74. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
75. See Ratiner & Wright, supra note 70, at 757. Because of the Authority's
power to block a move to another forum, the alternatives offered by article 188 of
the Draft Convention, supra note 1, are not meaningful. Article 188 provides in
part1. Disputes between States Parties referred to in article 187, subparagraph (a), may be submitted(a) at the request of the parties to the dispute to a special chamber of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to be formed in accordance with Annex VI, articles 15 and 17; or
(b) at the request of any party to the dispute to an ad hoc chamber of
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber formed in accordance with Annex VI, article 37.
2. (a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a contract referred to in article 187, paragraph (c) (i), shall be submitted, at the
request of any party to the dispute, to binding commercial arbitration, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree. A commercial arbitral tribunal, to which such dispute is submitted, shall have no jurisdiction to

the Tribunal will display, or at least has the built-in mechanisms
for, a strong bias in favor of the developing countries. Consequently, the fair and equitable nature of the Tribunal is suspect.
The dispute settlement provisions, although useful in that they
codify and describe alternative international dispute settlement
mechanisms, do not present a significant advance over the present system of international law 76 for several reasons. The Convention contains severe limitations on the compulsory dispute
settlement provisions which may exclude judicial determination
in certain categories of disputes. 77 These limitations and optional
exceptions reduce the practical effects of the Convention because
those categories which are or may be excluded--certain fishery issues, the exercise of coastal State sovereignty, enforcement authority, and any decision concerning foreign research within an
EEZ-are the most likely to lead to dispute. 78 The Convention
apparently leaves these matters to the traditional means of dispute settlement. Moreover, with the possible exception of deep
seabed mining, the compulsory procedures are only applicable
once the means chosen by the parties to the dispute fail. Thus
parties are likely to continue to employ traditional methods of
dispute settlement extensively.
The Tribunal, while it represents some advances, duplicates
most of the ICJ's weaknesses. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
with the exception of deep seabed mining matters, is based on
consent. Again except in the case of deep seabed mining, nationals and international organizations do not have contentious standing.79 The Tribunal is also of dubious legal independence. The
members of the Tribunal are dependent on the Authority for their
decide any question of interpretation of this Convention. When the dispute also involves a question of interpretation of Part XI and the Annexes
relating thereto, with respect to activities in the Area, that question shall
be referred to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber for a ruling.
Id.
With respect to the alternative fora presented in paragraph 1, the Authority may
prevent submission of the dispute simply by refusing to consent. With respect to
paragraph 2 which subjects particular disputes to commercial arbitration unless
otherwise agreed, the Authority may circumvent the provision by requiring that
contractors agree to the submission of all disputes of this nature to the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber as a condition for the Authority's approval of a work plan. Arguably this would be nonreversible by the Chamber because it is an exercise of
the Authority's discretionary power in "negotiating" the terms of a contract. See
Ratiner &Wright, supra note 70, at 759.
76. Breaux, The Diminishing Prospects for an Acceptable Law of the Sea
Treaty, 19 VA. J. I T'L L. 249, 287 (1979).
77. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
78. Breaux, supra note 76, at 287.
79. The Assembly and the Council of the Authority also may request advisory
opinions from the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber with respect to deep seabed activities. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 191.
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election (and re-election),8o and the State parties determine the
remuneration of the members. 8 ' The Authority and the State parties bear the expenses of the Tribunal. Finally, the Tribunal must
82
depend on the Authority for the enforcement of its decisions.
Thus, the Tribunal is, in a very real sense, a subsidiary organ of
the Authority.
Finally, the creation of the Tribunal may weaken the legitimacy
of international legal institutions. The overlap of subject matter
jurisdiction among the various proposed fora could lead to "unnecessary multiplicity of jurisdictions and conflicting jurisprudence. '83 The fact that the decisions of international courts have
no value as precedent in their own proceedings, much less in the
disputes before other bodies, further complicates the matter.
Should judicial organs of equal status issue divergent opinions,
the legitimacy of international adjudication becomes suspect.
This conflicting jurisprudence, in conjunction with the possible
proliferation of politically biased legal institutions, could lead to
increased forum-shopping. The net result would be an even
greater reluctance among States to employ international dispute
settlement mechanisms.
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that the dispute settlement provisions of the Convention are unsatisfactory.
The procedures have a built-in bias towards the G-77, and the system as a whole does not present a significant advance over the
current practice of dispute settlement. A number of alternatives
to the law of the sea dispute settlement regime exist, yet none is
84
without its political or practical disadvantages.
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE SETrLmENT AmEANGEMENTS

Some form of compulsory dispute settlement procedure is nec80. See note 49, supra.
81. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex VI, art. 18.
82. The Tribunal, if it develops into a politically-biased entity, will exercise a
great deal of power because of its affliation with the Authority to enforce its judgments. One commentator has suggested that "[p]ressure could be exerted in various ways, for instance by denying licenses for resource exploitation to refractory
states, or even by denying to these states the use of ocean space beyond national
jurisdiction." Pardo, supra note 2, at 15.
83. Adede, supra note 3, at 258.
84. This article assumes that renegotiating the dispute settlement provisions
of the Convention to remove the undesirable provisions discussed in Part I[ is politically impossible within the context of UNCLOS II.

essary in the Convention to remove dispute settlement from the
arena of force. 85 In order to enable the system to deal with the
greatest possible number and types of disputes, any proposed
procedure would have to eliminate or at least severely curtail the
limitations and exceptions to the compulsory jurisdiction currently found in the Convention. These limitations and exceptions
have the effect of removing from the compulsory procedure precisely those matters most likely to lead to dispute. 86 The political
feasibility, however, of eliminating these limitations completely is
doubtful. The negotiations on the Convention dispute settlement
provisions indicate the sensitivity of coastal States with respect to
their exercise of sovereignty in the EEZ.87
Similary, because of the jealous guarding of State sovereignty,
any dispute settlement procedure would have to allow State parties to choose methods of dispute settlement, such as arbitration
or conciliation, other than the proposed compulsory mechanism.
Nevertheless, use of the compulsory procedure entailing binding
decisions should be encouraged. To facilitate this goal, acceptance of the jurisdiction of the proposed court or tribunal should
be a mandatory obligation of the signatories of the Convention.
In addition, a fair and equitable international court or tribunal
may serve to overcome the reluctance of State parties to submit
disputes to an international legal institution for adjudication.
Having the ICJ as the main adjudicatory body for dispute settlement in the area of the law of the sea is one possible alternative. The ICJ has several advantages. The institution is already
well established, and no expense would be involved in setting up
the necessary machinery. Also, the ICJ already has an established procedure with which the international legal community is
familiar. If the parties are willing to submit their dispute to an international forum, they are more likely to use the ICJ than a forum with which they have less experience. The ICJ has had some
experience in the law of the sea. This, in conjunction with the
fact that the ICJ would be the sole adjudicatory forum, would
avoid the undesirable effects of a multiplicity of fora. The appearance of a conflicting jurisprudence would be unlikely. Conse85. As past experience with dispute settlement demonstrates, States with a
doubtful legal case are unwilling to submit it to the IM. Generally, they maintain
open disputes, waiting for a more favorable political climate. Even those States
which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ ignore ICJ proceedings when it has suited their purposes. Usually a State will submit a claim only
when it has an irrefutable case or it is the weaker party. The current system also
has problems with the execution and enforcement of judgments. Pardo, supra
note 2, at 15.
86. See notes 41-45, 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
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quently, a greater uniformity in the interpretation and application
of the Convention would result. Finally, the ICJ is currently drastically underemployed.8 8 An increased role for the ICJ in the
Convention could increase the caseload of the court.
The ICJ is not, however, without drawbacks. The access to the
ICJ is restricted. Only States may bring a dispute before the ICJ.
Individuals and international organizations have no contentious
standing.8 9 Thus the utility of the ICJ in the area of deep seabed
disputes is limited due to the extensive involvement of natural
and juridical persons and international organizations in the process. The solution to this problem would be to amend the Statute
of the ICJ to permit access by these entities engaging in deep seabed mining. The question then becomes whether the ICJ should
open its doors to other individuals and international organizations
having cognizable claims. Having given access to those engaged
in deep seabed mining, little justification would exist for the ICJ
to distinguish these entities from others participating in different
activities.
Assuming that such an amendment of the Statute was politically possible, increased access to the ICJ may have adverse effects on the functioning of the court. Although the ICJ is
presently underemployed, the increased access may lead eventually to a flood of cases, creating a backlog in the ICJ's docket.
Also, considering the amount of scientific and technical
knowledge necessary in the law of the sea alone, whether the
court could develop the needed expertise to deal effectively with
the diverse issues raised in a vast array of dissimilar cases is
doubtful. Finally, the ICJ is not free from a reputation of bias.
Lesser developed countries view the ICJ with distrust because
88. Reid, Commentary in LAw or THE SEA, supra note 47, at 246.
89. Some debate still exists as to whether granting access to international
courts and tribunals to individuals and international organizations is desirable:

On the one hand there are states who argue that it would be absurd to
have a situation where a national of one state could initiate action against
another state without the consent of his host state, or even in a situation
where the host state strongly objects to the individual initiating such action. This is alleged to run completely counter to established principles of

international law. The argument against this is that in practice there may
be several instances where, for example, a smaller state may not wish to
initiate or sponsor action on behalf of one of its nationals against a larger

state for fear of the diplomatic and political repercussions, but at the same

time the host state would be quite prepared to give its blessing to the national pursuing his claim against another state in his own right.

Reid, supra note 88, at 248.

the "Big Five," the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China, enjoy permanent seats on the court. 90
An international tribunal could be devised whose features
would address most of the foregoing problems. This body would
replace the ICJ so as to avoid a multiplicity of fora. Access would
be open to States, natural and juridical persons, and international
organizations. The tribunal would have a number of specialized
chambers to deal with specific broad categories of disputes, e.g.,
human rights, foreign investment, law of the sea, etc. Thus the
number of chambers would help prevent a backlog of cases, and
the specialization would enable the chambers to develop the necessary expertise. The assistance of scientific and technical experts who would sit without vote with the chamber at the request
of the chamber also would further the development of the desired
expertise. Appeals from these chambers could be had to an international court of appeals. This procedure could place a check on
any chamber which may demonstrate a political bias. Furthermore, the procedure would promote a reputation for impartial and
equitable adjudication.
The General Assembly of the United Nations would select the
members of the chambers and the court of appeals with an eye
toward representation of all principal legal systems and equitable
geographical distribution. Also, the number of seats could be divided equally among the different political blocs so that the
number of Western members would not outnumber the Eastern
ones or the Northern members outnumber the Southern ones by
a significant margin. This assignment of seats is a delicate affair
as the political alignments change over time. A rough division
may be all that is required to achieve an equitable balance.
Keeping the members of this international tribunal independent from other international organizations and from States would
be highly desirable. To achieve this end, members should be
elected to serve a single ten-year term without the possibility of
re-election. Also, the remuneration of the members should not be
decreased during their tenure, and automatic cost-of-living increases in remuneration may be useful to prevent the international organization which controls the finances of the tribunal
from exercising undue financial pressure on the members of the
tribunal. While this system would help promote impartial adjudication of claims and a comprehensive, uniform jurisprudence, the
tribunal would not be entirely free from the possibility of undue
influence by the organization which controls its budget. Also,
90. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, art. 4.
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many of the current problems with the execution and enforcement of judgments would continue to exist.
CONCLUSION

The dispute settlement provisions of the Convention deserve
careful scrutiny because the Convention represents a significant
step in international lawmaking. If the Convention enters into
force, 91 the world will have achieved "a written constitution for
nearly three-quarters of the area of the earth's surface." 92 The
impact of the Convention reaches beyond the oceans. The ultimate resolution of the law of the sea will influence the outcome of
similar issues in other global common areas such as international
airspace, the airwaves, and outer space. Thus any provision of
the Convention must be evaluated not only in terms of the law of
the sea, but also with respect to its precedential value for future
conferences.
The current proposal for dispute settlement in the Convention
is disappointing. The Convention has created a biased adjudicatory process which does not present an advance over current customary international law. This unsatisfactory result may have the
effect of causing nations to deal with law of the sea disputes in an
individual or regional manner rather than on an international
level. Serious consideration must be given to revamping the ICJ
or creating a similar tribunal in an effort to increase the legitimacy of international dispute adjudication.

91. See U.S. Bans Treaty for Now on Use of Sea Resources, New York Times,
March 7, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
92. Statement by Ambassador at Large Elliot L. Richardson, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference, Ninth Session of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Aug. 29, 1980).

